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FORCED DECRYPTION AS EQUILIBRIUM—
WHY IT’S CONSTITUTIONAL AND HOW RILEY
MATTERS
Dan Terzian*
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence seeks equilibrium. 1 When new
technology frustrates the government’s ability to obtain evidence, “the
Supreme Court generally adopts lower Fourth Amendment
protections . . . to help restore the status quo ante level of government
power.”2 Conversely, when new technology “makes evidence substantially
easier for the government to obtain, the Supreme Court often embraces
higher protections to help restore the prior level of privacy protection.”3
One need not search far back to find equilibrium-seeking in action—see
Riley v. California,4 a Supreme Court decision of just this past term on the
Fourth Amendment and cellphones.
Yet equilibrium-seeking is not confined to that Amendment. In the
Fifth Amendment, too, the Court seeks equilibrium. Throughout SelfIncrimination Clause jurisprudence, one finds the Court balancing privacy
against the government’s need to obtain evidence.5
Enter: encrypted data and the compelled production thereof, an
area in want of equilibrium. Previously, when the government obtained a
warrant for data, it got that data. But now when the sought data is
encrypted, the government instead gets a password prompt. If that password
is strong, the computer is, in Riley’s words, “all but ‘unbreakable.’”6 This
leaves the government with just one option: obtaining a subpoena to force
the person to enter her password and thereby decrypt the data. But does the
Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause bar this forced decryption?
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Lower courts have not yet sought, nor even considered,
equilibrium in answering this question.7 The only federal appeals court
ruling on the issue essentially held that the Fifth Amendment prohibits
forced decryption.8 There goes the government’s ability to obtain digital
evidence in that circuit.
This is a mistake. Courts should begin seeking equilibrium in their
Fifth Amendment analyses. Riley itself, even though a Fourth Amendment
case, signals courts to do so. The Riley Court sought equilibrium, and its
decision tells lower courts to do similarly, to “feel free to read Supreme
Court precedents narrowly” in other cases involving new technologies.9
Encryption is such a new technology: It vitiates the government’s ability to
gather evidence. Paper documents—even if locked in a safe—can be
recovered;10 an encrypted computer’s documents cannot. Maintaining
equilibrium here requires permitting forced decryption, and SelfIncrimination Clause precedent can be interpreted as permitting it. Courts
should therefore adopt that interpretation.
This Essay first introduces Self-Incrimination Clause doctrine
apart from any equilibrium analysis (Part I); then discusses Riley and its
equilibrium-seeking (Part II); and last argues that Riley supports finding
forced decryption constitutional (Part III).
I. THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
The Self-Incrimination Clause declares that “[n]o person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”11 The
privilege against self-incrimination, where applicable, gives persons the
right to refuse the government’s demands for information, data, or objects.12
The privilege applies wherever the government (1) compels (2) a
testimonial communication or act that (3) is incriminating.13 In practice, the
analysis focuses only on the element of testimonial communications or acts,
because the other two’s existence or nonexistence is “obvious.”14
Communications or acts can be testimonial for two independent
reasons: because they convey an implied communication or because they
7
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require substantial mental effort. Implied communications arise from
producing documents. If you, say, produce files from a specific computer,
you’re implying that you possess or control that computer.15 This
production can be testimonial and therefore barred by the Fifth
Amendment.16
Implied communications pose no real concern to forced decryption’s
constitutionality for two reasons. First, the government can compel the
production if it provides act of production immunity. This “immuniz[es] the
testimonial component of the act”—the government cannot use it to prove
ownership—but lets the government use the data obtained from the
computer to prove anything else.17
Second, the government may be able to compel production through the
“foregone conclusion” exception. Where the government can
“independently confirm” the testimonial component (here, computer
ownership) through specific “prior knowledge” that goes beyond mere
suspicion, it can still compel production.18 So when the government finds a
desktop computer in Winston’s unshared studio apartment, that computer’s
password prompt lists the user as “Winston,” and the only fingerprints on
the computer are Winston’s, his ownership is likely a foregone conclusion
and the files’ production can be compelled.19
Contrast implied communications with the stronger reason why forced
decryption could be viewed as testimonial: through substantial mental
effort. Compelled acts requiring substantial mental effort are testimonial,
while those requiring little are not.20 Note that the foregone conclusion
exception applies here too—if the government seeks a specific document
and knows it’s on your computer, the exception applies regardless of the
mental effort involved.21
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Consider the following examples of testimonial communications
through mental effort. Producing handwriting or voice samples requires
relatively little mental effort—just, basically, commanding yourself to write
or speak—so compelling their production is not testimonial and thus is
permissible.22 But responding to a subpoena seeking documents spanning
eleven broad categories and amounting to over 13,000 responsive pages?
That requires substantial mental effort and is therefore testimonial.23
Now, which example do you think forced decryption (compelling a
person to enter a password) is more like: writing some words or mining box
after box for responsive documents? Me too. This is how current doctrine
can be interpreted as permitting forced decryption.
To be sure, this interpretation is more nuanced at the margins. Maybe,
for instance, Julia does not remember her password and learning it requires
finding its various components stowed in numerous boxes. Even here,
though, forced decryption still does not require substantial mental effort.
Julia does not need to analyze a subpoena and make judgments about
whether certain documents are responsive.24 Rather, she knows exactly what
she needs to do—physically compile the password’s components and then
decrypt her computer—with no judgments being necessary.
Courts have not yet framed the issue this way.25 The Eleventh Circuit,
the only federal appeals court deciding it, found forced decryption
testimonial.26 Its analysis hinged on a line of Supreme Court dicta: the
production of strongbox keys can be compelled, but combinations to a safe
cannot.27 Because computer passwords are more like combinations than
keys, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a password’s production is
testimonial.28 It then concluded that forced decryption is also testimonial
because using a decryption password requires substantial mental effort, as
it’s also more like producing a combination than a key.29
This reasoning falters twice. First, it misreads Supreme Court dicta.
The dicta regards only compelling production: The government can compel
the production of keys but not the production of combinations.30 It’s silent
on whether the government can compel unlocking (i.e., forcing a person to
enter a combination without producing a copy). This silence, coupled with
the dicta’s rationale, suggests that compelled unlocking may be
constitutional. The reason for the Court distinguishing between key- and
22
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combination- productions stems from the Court’s concern over compelled
creation. Combinations may not exist outside a person’s mind, so producing
them would require compelling the creation of a physical version, and it is
this compelled creation that makes the response testimonial.31 There are no
such compelled creation concerns with compelled unlocking through forced
decryption—the data is already there, the person just needs to unlock it; and
unlocking it does not require creating a physical copy of the password.
The second stumble comes in the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of mental
effort. Entering an oft-used password requires no more mental effort than
finding a key.32 You remember the key’s location and then find it, just as
you remember the password and then input it.
Put aside the relative merits of these competing interpretations, mine
and the Eleventh Circuit’s; they matter little here. Instead, just accept that
the interpretation permitting forced decryption is theoretically possible
under current Fifth Amendment doctrine, even if you think it improbable.
Here’s why lower courts should nevertheless adopt the improbable
interpretation and permit forced decryption: Riley v. California.
II. EQUILIBRIUM-SEEKING IN RILEY V. CALIFORNIA
To start, Riley is not a Fifth Amendment case. It’s a Fourth
Amendment one, raising the question of whether the government can search
a person’s cellphone incident to arrest. The answer: Not without a warrant.33
That answer’s not terribly important for forced decryption cases. What
is important, however, are two principles Riley articulates that apply
broadly to criminal procedure jurisprudence. But before discussing those
principles, let me allay any initial concerns: It matters not that Riley regards
the Fourth Amendment and forced decryption regards the Fifth. In both
areas, “the Court zigs, zags, and balances, ad hoc” in an attempt to seek
equilibrium.34 Moreover, the Supreme Court long ago recognized that “[t]he
values protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . substantially overlap [with]
those . . . [that] the Fifth Amendment helps to protect.”35 Because Riley
essentially regards computers and touches upon encryption’s
impenetrability, that overlap is twofold here.
Now on to Riley’s two core principles. First, Riley thrice signals that
there should be computer-rules of criminal procedure, just as there are
31
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vehicle-rules.36 First by declaring that many cellphones “are in fact
minicomputers;”37 second by distinguishing these minicomputers from other
objects kept on the person;38 and third by declaring that searching
minicomputers cannot be analogized to other searches incident to arrest.39
On distinguishing computers, the Court recognized that cellphones are
“qualitatively different” from other objects people carry.40 The details they
contain about “the privacies of life” are so vast that they “implicate privacy
concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a
wallet, or a purse.”41 And as for not analogizing computer searches to other
contexts, the Court declined to “import[ ] [constitutional standards] from
the vehicle context” to cellphones.42 It then also rejected “an analogue test”
that would allow the government to search photos on a cellphone just as it
could search photos in a wallet.43
Riley’s second notable contribution is how it determines the cellphonesearch rule: by seeking equilibrium. Though this equilibrium-seeking is not
explicit, it is nevertheless apparent.44 The Court noted that people carried
relatively little personal information on their person before cellphones
existed, so searches incident to arrest did not give the government much
evidence.45 Cellphones changed this. They contain immense amounts of
“quantitative and . . . qualitative data” about a person’s life,46 which make
an arrestee’s privacy interest in her cellphone “dwarf those in [her other
personal property at hand].”47 Moreover, allowing cellphones to be searched
would make it too easy for the government to obtain evidence, because such
searches “would typically expose to the government far more than the most
exhaustive search of a house.”48 At bottom, the Court’s forbidding
cellphone searches incident to arrest maintained equilibrium by providing
higher protections for cellphones than for other objects, to help restore the
prior level of privacy protection.
36
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III. FORCED DECRYPTION AS EQUILIBRIUM
Riley’s two principles illuminate the forced decryption issue. The
repeated assertions that computers are different—suggesting there should be
computer-specific criminal procedure rules—send a flare to lower courts:
Don’t “too quickly follow broad statements from pre-digital opinions, even
if those opinions emanated from the Supreme Court itself.”49 Instead, courts
should “feel free to read Supreme Court precedents narrowly” in the context
of criminal procedure and new technologies.50 Just as Riley rejected an
analogue test to determine the constitutionality of cellphone searches, lower
courts should reject the same test to determine whether forced decryption is
constitutional. They need not inquire whether forcing Julia to decrypt her
hard drive is more like producing a safe combination than a strongbox key.
So even if the supposedly better interpretation of pre-digital Fifth
Amendment doctrine is that forced decryption is forbidden, lower courts
should instead—if there’s good reason to—adopt the possible interpretation
that forced decryption is permissible. And that good reason, Riley tells us, is
maintaining equilibrium.
This is why courts should allow forced decryption: to maintain the
equilibrium between individual privacy and government power that Riley
also seeks to balance. Prior to encryption, the government obtained a
warrant and got the sought data. Even if the sought documents were held in
a safe and the government lacked the combination, the government still
obtained them because it could crack the safe.51
Also note that the government has a right to this data once it
obtains a warrant. As Riley recognized, the “answer to the question of what
police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is
accordingly simple—get a warrant.”52 Once the government obtains that
warrant—once it has probable cause to believe the cellphone contains
evidence that “will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction” for a
particular offense—privacy concerns cease, and the government has the
right search it.53 If the cellphone is unencrypted, the government then
obtains the data pursuant to that warrant.

49

Re, supra note 9.
See id. (referring only to the Fourth Amendment).
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Terzian, supra note 5, at 310.
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Riley, No. 13-132, slip op. at 28.
53
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See also id., slip op. at 16, 25–26, 28; OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS,
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS 72–76 (3d ed. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/
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But if the data lies on an encrypted device, equilibrium is
disrupted. Encryption can be virtually unbreakable, so the government
cannot obtain readable data without forced decryption. Even though the
government has the right to obtain this data with a warrant. Even though it
would obtain this data if it were not encrypted. And even though all data,
encrypted or not, is increasingly essential evidence.54 In short, encryption
transforms the government’s right to obtain this evidence into a person’s
right to essentially destroy evidence by making it inaccessible, a right
fundamentally counter to established jurisprudence.55 The only way to
restore the status quo—to return the government’s ability to obtain evidence
to its ex ante level—is through finding forced decryption constitutional.
How, exactly, courts go about restoring equilibrium is a question
of line-drawing. Courts could say that forced decryption is always
constitutional because it’s a nontestimonial act and that’s all that matters.
Or they could find that forced decryption is just sometimes constitutional,
only where maintaining equilibrium actually requires it. So if the
government cannot at all obtain the data without forced decryption, it’s
constitutional; but if the government can easily obtain it (say by getting the
password from the person’s spouse), forced decryption is not constitutional.
Elsewhere I’ve suggested a slight preference for the circumstantial
approach.56 But the absolute approach—that forced decryption is always
constitutional—has merit as well. Chiefly, it’s easier in application, and
Riley rejects a circumstantial test in favor of an absolute ban on cellphone
searches incident to arrest.57 Wherever the line, it will likely be determined
just as it was in Riley: by the Supreme Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence seeks
equilibrium, and Riley calls for lower courts to seek it as well. Courts
interpreting the Fifth Amendment and whether it permits forced decryption
should therefore consider equilibrium. Permitting forced decryption
maintains the status quo; forbidding forced decryption destroys it. Because
Fifth Amendment doctrine can be interpreted as allowing forced decryption
and because doing so maintains equilibrium, courts should find forced
decryption constitutional.
54
See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 532 (2005)
(stating that “computers have become an increasingly important source of evidence” and searching them
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